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INTRODUCTION TO *Whither China?*

The document which follows is the most elaborate account of the views of the Left in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution—GPCR—which we have been able to find. It is a report of Hunan Provincial Proletarian Revolutionary Great Alliance—"Sheng-wu-lien," from the initials of these words—and was apparently drafted on January 9, 1968. It appeared in a Canton tabloid two weeks later, showing the close connections which the Left in Hunan had established with their colleagues in Kwangtung. Also, members of "Sheng-wu-lien" were accused by the Central leaders, in speeches in Peking in January, of forming close ties with Leftists in the "May 16 Corps" of Peking.

The report reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the Left. There is a clear analysis of the class situation, the holding of state power by a "red" bourgeoisie, the policies and ideological weaknesses which led up to the overthrow of proletarian dictatorship and the steps which would be necessary in order that the proletarian forces come back into power.

*But there is also the contradictory aspect of apologetics for Mao. Even where all the official statements had clearly expressed views opposed to the Left, such as on the "cadre question," the authors of *Whither China?* persist in ascribing their own views to Mao and hoping that he would break with the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and put himself at the head of a new "Mao Tse-tung Thought" Party. The pernicious effect of years of the Mao cult is operating here.*

*There are many indications, however, that some Leftists had broken through this mystification. *Whither China?* refers to "ultras" within its own ranks who opposed a stage-by-stage conception of the GPCR and apparently did not buy the rationalization that Mao's Centrist concessions to the enemy were really necessary strategic retreats by a master revolutionary leader who shared the ultimate goals of the left. The materials put out by conservative Red Guard organizations attacking the Left refer repeatedly to attacks on Mao and Lin Piao emanating from their enemies. So far, however, *Whither China?* is the best we have to go on and a careful analytical reading of it will verify our position and reveal the weaknesses which led the Chinese Left to defeat.*

'Whither China?'

Note: This draft solicits your opinions on the following questions. Is it appropriate to announce it publicly at present? May it serve as the "Inaugural Declaration of the 'Ultra-Left' Commune?" How should it be further revised? Please write your opinions on the right-hand margin of each page and return this draft to the issuing source before the 20th.

A soldier of the Steel 319 Corps,
"Seize Military Power" of Sheng-wu-lien,
First Middle School, Red Rebel Committee.
January 12, 1968

When the counteroffensive in the struggle against the adverse current reached July, August and September [of 1967], the people of the whole country had a sense of vigorous growth, believing that there was hope of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution being "carried through to the end," and that all traditional ideas that fettered the mind of the people would be cast aside. However, an adverse current of counterrevolutionary reformism appeared after October at the upper levels and descended below. An atmosphere of class compromise [in place of class struggle], calling for "an end to the first cultural revolution," suddenly became intense. Again, the people of the whole country were bewildered. The educated youth and students in particular, being extra sensitive, were the first to feel it. Again, questions were asked. What shall we do? Whither China? The establishment of the "Ultra-Left" Commune was for the sake, first of all, of answering this solemn question.

To answer this question correctly, it is necessary earnestly to sum up the very rich experience and lessons brought forth since 1967 by the greatest revolution in history, principally the experience of great significance created by the "January Storm" and the "August partial domestic revolutionary war" [in later sections of this essay, this is usually referred to as the "August Storm"; for convenience, this shorter term will be used in this translation].

(1) The Scientific Prediction

Contemporary China is the focus of world contradictions, and the center of the storm of world revolution. As regards this crucially important subject of where China is going, the great teacher of the world proletariat, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has outwardly made only an abstract prediction.

Just before the world-shaking Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was to rise from the east with the force of a thunderbolt, Chairman Mao, with his

great all-embracing proletarian feelings, announced to the world that China's first Marxist big-character poster "is the manifesto of the Peking Peoples Commune in the 1960's" [PR, No. 6 (February 3, 1967), p. 13]. It was these words that announced the official beginning of the vehement development among the masses of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. These words also showed that Chairman Mao "wisely and with genius foresaw the emergence of a brand-new situation in our state organs" (*Red Flag*, No. 3, 1967, editorial), that is, political organs of the Paris Commune type. In the January Revolution, Chairman Mao again proposed the name "Peoples Commune of China." That meant that, as an ultimate result of the first Great Cultural Revolution, China would advance in the direction of a "Peoples Commune of China."

However, because the revolution had developed at the time only to a very low level, historical limitations enabled almost no one to understand the ultimate goal of the first Cultural Revolution as pointed out by Chairman Mao. People regarded this statement of Chairman Mao as words of general praise and gradually forgot it.

Even before the Cultural Revolution officially began, Chairman Mao, in his famous May 7 Directive [1966, in PR, No. 32 (August 5, 1966), pp. 6-7: sections in bold type], had already depicted the contents of this new type of political structure—the "Peoples Commune of China." But people in general regarded the sketch in the May 7 Directive as an idealistic "communist utopia." Everyone thought that it was not practical to take the May 7 directive as the immediate goal of our recent struggle. At present it is only part of the educated youth that keep reciting the May 7 Directive, and loudly declare that they want to fight for realization of the May 7 Directive. They realize that only the new society sketched in the May 7 Directive, which is different from the existing society, is the society in which they will gain liberation. But even among the educated youth, there are many who think it impractical to realize in the near future the kind of society described in the May 7 Directive. It is truer to say that their energetic publicity about the May 7 Directive is self-consolation for their dissatisfaction with reality, than it is to say that they are striving with full faith for the realization of the May 7 Directive.

Chairman Mao's scientific prediction has left a utopian impression in people's minds. This is in accord with the fact that class struggle has not yet developed to an acute and high stage. The development of new productive forces in China today has brought into conflict the class that represents the new productive forces [presumably the proletariat, the representative of which Sheng-wu-lien claims to be] and the decaying class that represents [old] production relations which impede the progress of history. [Probable meaning: the present Red bourgeoisie, which still represents the old (i.e., capitalist) production relations, prevents the proletariat from exercising its self-government which would correspond to the new (i.e., socialist) production relations.] Moreover, it will lead inevitably to a great social revolution, and a new society will inevitably be born amid the fierce flames. This objective law is the solid basis for Chairman Mao's scientific—not utopian—prediction. At present, people do not yet understand this law. It is natural, therefore, that this scientific predic-

tion has left people with the impression of being purely a utopian dream of the beautiful future? People believe that China will pass peacefully into the society depicted in the May 7 Directive.

What is the reality? "Peaceful transition" is only another name for "peaceful evolution." It can only cause China to drift farther and farther away from the "Commune" depicted in the May 7 Directive, and nearer and nearer to the existing society of the Soviet Union [which Sheng-wu-lien abhors]. What Chairman Mao puts forward, i.e., "revolution in which one class overthrows another" and "a great alliance of proletarian revolutionaries to seize power from the capitalist-roaders," solves the question of practical transition toward the commune. The rule of the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie must be overthrown by force in order to solve the problem of political power. Empty shouting about realization of the May 7 Directive, without any reference to power seizure and complete smashing of the old state machinery, will truly be the "utopian" dream.

(2) *The January Revolutionary Storm*

Lenin once made this famous statement: "Any revolution, as long as it is a true revolution, is, in the final analysis, a change of class. Therefore, the best means of heightening the awareness of the masses and exposing the deception of the masses with revolutionary vows, is to analyze the class changes that have taken place or are taking place in the revolution." Let us follow this teaching and make an analysis of the class changes which took place in the January Revolution, so as to expose the deception of the masses with revolutionary promises.

As everybody knows, the greatest fact of the January Revolution was that 90 per cent of the senior cadres [of the Party] were made to stand aside. In Hunan, Chang P'ing-hua, Chang Po-shen, Hua Kuo-feng and the like had their power reduced to zero. At the Center [Peking], power seizure [by representatives of the Cultural Revolution] took place in the Ministry of Finance, the Radio Broadcasting Administration Bureau and other departments; and the power of people like Li Hsien-nien, Ch'en Yi, T'an Chen-lin, as well as that of Chou En-lai who represented them, was greatly diminished. Into whose hands did the assets go at that time? They went into the hands of the people, who were full of boundless enthusiasm, and who were organized to take over the urban administrations and the Party, government, financial and cultural powers in industry, commerce, communications, and so forth. What the editorial had called for was truly realized, i.e., that "the masses should rise and take hold of the destiny of their socialist country and themselves administer the cities, industry, communications, and finance."

The storm of the January Revolution turned all this within a very short time from the hands of the bureaucrats into the hands of the enthusiastic working class. Society suddenly found, in the absence of bureaucrats, that they could not only go on living, but could live better and develop quicker and with greater freedom. It was not at all like the intimidation of the bureaucrats who, before the revolution, had said: "Without us, production would collapse, and the society would fall into a state of hopeless confusion."

As a matter of fact, without the bureaucrats and bureaucratic organs, productivity was greatly liberated. After the Ministry of the Coal Industry fell, production of coal went on as usual. The Ministry of Railways fell, but transportation was carried on as usual. All departments of the provincial Party committees fell, but the various branches of their work went on as usual. Moreover, the working class were greatly liberated in their enthusiasm and initiative for production. The management of industrial plants by the workers themselves after January was impressive. For the first time, the workers had the feeling that "it is not the state which manages us; but we who manage the state." For the first time, they felt that they were producing for themselves. Their enthusiasm had never been so high, and their sense of responsibility as masters of the house had never been so strong. Changsha Weaving and Spinning Mill and other factories also created rebel working-groups and countless other new things. [According to information reaching the outside world from Shanghai, the situation there was far from happy at this time and was reflected in workers' criticisms of changes enforced by the Red Guards.]

This was the true content of the class changes in the January Revolution. As a matter of fact, in this short period some places realized, though not very thoroughly, the content of the "Peoples Commune of China." The society found itself in a state of "mass dictatorship" similar to that of the Paris Commune. The January Storm told people that China would go toward a society which had no bureaucrats, and that 90 per cent of the senior cadres had already formed a privileged class. The objective law of the development of class struggle caused the majority of them to stand aside in January. The fact that 90 per cent of the senior cadres had to stand aside in the storm of the January Revolution was certainly not an error by the "masses." "The masses are the real heroes." Those who committed the most serious crimes were duly punished: "very few received undue punishment."

Facts as revealed by the masses, and the indignation which they brought forth, first told the people that this class of "Red" capitalists had entirely become a decaying class that hindered the progress of history. The relations between them and the people in general had changed from relations between leaders and the led, to those between rulers and the ruled and between exploiters and the exploited. From the relations between revolutionaries of equal standing, it had become a relationship between oppressors and the oppressed. The special privileges and high salaries of the class of "Red" capitalists were built upon the foundation of oppression and exploitation of the broad masses of the people. In order to realize the "Peoples Commune of China," it was necessary to overthrow this class.

The January Revolutionary Storm was a great attempt by the revolutionary people, under the leadership of Chairman Mao, to topple the old world and build a new world. The program of the first great proletarian political [sic!] revolution was formulated at that great moment. Chairman Mao stated: "This is one class overthrowing another. This is a great revolution." This shows that the Cultural Revolution is not a revolution of dismissing officials or a movement of dragging out people, nor a purely cultural revolution, but is "a revolution in which one class overthrows another." With relation to

the facts of the January Revolutionary Storm, the overthrown class is none other than the class of "bureaucratism" formed in China in the last 17 years. . . .

There is no place here for reformism—combining two into one—or peaceful transition. The old state machinery must be utterly smashed. "Completely smash the old exploitative system, the revisionist system, and the bureaucratic organs." . . .

The problems of system, policy, and guideline touched upon in the January Revolution mainly concerned such capitalist systems of labor employment as contracted labor and temporary labor, as well as the revisionist movement of going to the mountainous areas and the countryside.

At present, the "Ultra-Left" must organize people to sum up and to study properly the multitude of things created by the January Revolutionary Storm. These new things are the embryonic form of a new society of the Paris Commune type.

(3) *The Revolutionary Committees*

Why did Chairman Mao, who strongly advocated the "commune," suddenly oppose the establishment of the "Shanghai Peoples Commune" in January? This is something which the revolutionary people find hard to understand.

Chairman Mao, who foresaw the "commune" as the political structure which must be realized by the first Cultural Revolution, suddenly proposed: "Revolutionary committees are fine!"

Revolution must progress along a zigzag course. It must go through a prolonged course of "struggle—failure—struggle again—failure again—struggle again—until final victory."

Why cannot communes be established immediately?

This is the first time the revolutionary people tried to overthrow their powerful enemy. How shallow their knowledge of this revolution was! Not only did they fail consciously to understand the necessity to completely smash the old state machinery and to overhaul some of the social systems, they also did not even recognize the fact that their enemy formed a class. The revolutionary ranks were dominated by ideas of "revolution to dismiss officials" and "revolution to drag out people." The wisdom of the masses had not yet developed to the degree at which it was possible to reform society. Therefore, in the final analysis, the fruit of the revolution was taken away by the capitalist class [of the China of 1967].

Any revolution must naturally involve the army. Since a Red capitalist class is already formed in China, the army of course cannot detach itself from this reality. Yet the January Storm did not in any way touch on this vital problem of all revolutions—the problem of the army. Thus it may be seen that the [January] Revolution lacked depth and remained at a low stage of development. The degree of maturity of the political thought of the revolutionary people also was in conformity with this low level revolution—it, too, remained at a very immature stage.

At this kind of time when complete victory is impossible, to try to achieve real victory is Left adventurism. In light of the inevitability that the capitalist class will seize the fruits of the revolution, the correct strategic policy is to

enable the people to forge their political and ideological weapon in struggle at a higher stage and, through the ebb and flow of the revolution, to prepare their strength for winning the final victory. Otherwise, if "communes" are established while the masses have not yet fully understood that their interest lies in the realization of "communes" in China, the "communes" will be communes in name only, and in reality they will be sham "communes," essentially the same as the present revolutionary committees in which power is usurped by the [Red] bourgeoisie.

Therefore, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the great supreme commander of the proletariat, did not hesitate in the least to go against the dream, cherished by immature revolutionaries, for the immediate establishment of communes. He adopted the correct strategic policy, and at the same time called upon the army to "Support the Left" [January 23, 1967]. "Support the Left" is, in fact, Chairman Mao's ingenious means of carrying out cultural revolution in the armed forces. . . .

The three-in-one combination is the concrete content of the Revolutionary Committees. [What is meant is the informal alliance between Army, cadres, and mass organizations which preceded the official formation of Revolutionary Committees.] Proposing the three-in-one combination is tantamount to helping the reinstatement of the bureaucrats already toppled in the January Revolution. Moreover, the three-in-one combination will inevitably be a type of regime for the [Red] bourgeoisie to usurp power, in which the army and local bureaucrats will play a leading role. Chairman Mao also called the revolutionary committee of the three-in-one combination a "provisional organ of power." It is only a transitional form, and not the ultimate product of the first Cultural Revolution. The ultimate product of the first Cultural Revolution will be the "commune" and not the revolutionary committee. . . . However, the aforementioned transitional form is necessary. To deny the transitional form is Leftist empty talk.

(4) *The February Adverse Current*

The force and intensity of the January Revolution caused the bureaucrats to carry out a hurried usurpation of power. Contrary to their usual attitude, they adopted the most urgent and savage means of suppression. This proves negatively the intensity of the "redistribution of property (of means of production) and power" resulting when 90 per cent of the senior cadres stood aside in the January Revolution. The tragic consequences of the February Adverse Current also prove the correctness of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's prediction that "there can be no immediate victory."

The "Red" capitalist class gained an almost overwhelming ascendancy in February and March [1967]. The property (of means of production) and power were wrested away from the hands of the revolutionary people and returned to the bureaucrats. In early spring, in February, Lung Shu-chin, Liu Tzu-yun, Chang Po-shen, Hua Kuo-feng, and bureaucrats throughout the country and their agents at the Center, wielded unlimited power. It was their heyday, while the power of the revolutionary people dropped to zero. Moreover, large numbers of revolutionary people were thrown into prison by the

state organs—public security, procuracy, and judicial organs—controlled by the capitalist class.

Intoxicated by his victory of February-March, Chou En-lai—at present the chief representative of China's "Red" capitalist class—hurriedly tried to set up revolutionary committees in all parts of the country. If this bourgeois plan had been achieved, the proletariat would have retreated to its grave. Therefore, without waiting for the establishment of all the revolutionary committees, the Central Cultural Revolution Group [of Chiang Ch'ing, etc.] gave orders at the end of March to launch a counteroffensive. From then on, the great August Storm began to brew.

In the struggle to hit back at the February Adverse Current, the important sign that the revolution had entered into a higher stage was that the problem of the army really began to be touched upon. During the January Revolution, the revolutionary people had very childish ideas on the problem of the army. They thought that as soon as the local capitalist-roaders were overthrown, the armed forces would unite with the revolutionary people in accordance with Chairman Mao's order for union from the upper to the lower levels. The bloody facts of the February Adverse Current made the people aware that the upper-to-lower order alone could not bring about an implementation of Chairman Mao's intentions in the armed forces. The common interests of capitalist-roaders in the armed forces and those of local capitalist-roaders would make it impossible for the army to carry out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. It was necessary to carry out cultural revolution from the lower level upward in the army, and to rely on the people's revolution—the locomotive of progress in history—in order to change the antagonism between the army and the people brought about by the control of the army by the bureaucrats.

The struggle since February has placed the grave problem of the army before the broad masses (previously it had been discussed only before Chairman Mao and a few others). This is gradually providing the conditions for solution of the problem through the strength of the broad masses of the people. It has been scientifically foreseen that in the new society of the "commune," the military force will be very different from the present-day army. The struggle since February has enabled this idea of Chairman Mao gradually to take hold of the masses.

(5) The August Local Civil Revolutionary War

Since the end of January [1967], the rebels have written many articles on the problem of the armed forces. . . . Many articles discussing the problem of the army are very immature and have great shortcomings. These writings, however, constitute a new thing which history will prove to be of significance.

How well Engels spoke when he commented on utopian socialism: "Let the pedlars of the circle of authors solemnly find fault with the imaginations which at present can only make people laugh. Let them gratify themselves with the thought that their strict way of thinking is superior to such mad ideas. What makes us glad is the gifted ideological buds and gifted ideas that show themselves everywhere by breaking through the outer shell of imagination. These things the mediocre people cannot see."

There are two essential points in the articles about the army.

1. It is now seen that the present army is different from the people's army of before the Liberation [i.e., before 1949]. Before Liberation, the army and the people fought together to overthrow imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, and feudalism. The relationship between army and people was like that of fish and water [Mao's favorite picture for describing the ideal relationship between guerrillas and the masses]. After Liberation, as the target of revolution has changed from imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism and feudalism to capitalist-roaders, and as these capitalist-roaders are power-holders in the army, some of the armed forces in the revolution have not only changed their blood-and-flesh relationship with the people that existed before Liberation, but have even become tools for suppressing the revolution. Therefore, if the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is to succeed, it is necessary to bring about a basic change in the army. The "Ultra-Left faction" has found the basis for its thinking in *Quotations from Chairman Mao*. Chairman Mao . . . has also pointed out that after the troops were kept in barracks, they became separated from the people.

2. It is now seen that a revolutionary war in the country is necessary before the revolutionary people can overcome the armed Red capitalist class. The large-scale armed struggle in August between the proletariat and the Red capitalist class, and the local revolutionary war, proved this prediction. The experience created by the local revolutionary wars in August is moreover unparalleled in history and very great. Contrary to the expectations of the mass of mediocre people, history advanced in the direction predicted by the "heretics." Hitherto unimaginable, large-scale gun-seizing incidents occurred regularly in accordance with the pace of historical development. Local wars of varying magnitude broke out in the country in which the armed forces were directly involved (in some places, including Kiangsi and Hangchow, the army fought directly). The creative spirit and revolutionary fervor displayed by the people in August were extremely impressive. Gun-seizing became a "movement." Its magnitude, and the power and heroism of the revolutionary war, were so great that in that moment people were deeply impressed that "the people, and the people alone, are the motive force of historical development."

For a short time, the cities were in a state of "armed mass dictatorship." The power in most of the industries, commerce, communications, and urban administration was again taken away from Chang Po-shen, Hua Kuo-feng, Lung Shu-chin, Liu Tzu-yun and their like and put into the hands of the revolutionary people. Never before had the revolutionary people appeared on the stage of history in the role of masters of world history as they did in August. Primary students voluntarily did the work of communications and security. Their brave gestures in directing traffic, and the pride with which "Storm Over Hsiang River," "Red Middle Committee" [See Document 5] and other mass organizations directly exercised some of the financial-economic powers, left an unforgettable impression with the people.

August was the time when the power of the revolutionary mass organizations rapidly grew, while that of the bureaucrats again dropped to zero. For the second time, a temporary and unstable redistribution of property and

power took place. Once more, society tried to realize the great "People's Commune of China." Once more, people tried to solve the problem raised in the May 7 Directive, namely, that "the army should be a great school" and "workers, peasants, and students should all study military affairs." This attempt had not been made in the January Revolution. Before Liberation, the army actually was a great school which maintained excellent relations with the masses, and which combined the roles of soldiers, students, civilians, peasants, and workers. This was summed up by Chairman Mao just before the victory of the Democratic Revolution. Why then, more than ten years after Liberation, should the question again be raised of improving army-civilian relations, and "the army should be a great school"? As said in the preceding paragraph, it is because after the Liberation the army has undergone changes and, to greater or lesser degree, has separated itself from the masses. As a result, this question is again put on the agenda.

The great pioneering act of the August Storm was the emergence of an armed force [in addition to the Army] organized by the revolutionary people themselves. This force becomes the actual force of the proletarian dictatorship (or dictatorship over the capitalist-roaders). They and the people are in accord, and fight together to overthrow the "Red" capitalist class. The people, instead of lamenting the fall of the Military Region command—a bureaucratic organ—rejoice at it. Yet formerly they used to think they could not get along without it. This fact has enabled the proletariat to foresee more realistically where China's army is going, and to envisage the armed strength of the new society—the "Peoples Commune of China." It may be said with certainty that China will be a society in which the army is the people, the people are the army, the people and the army are united as one, and the army has shaken off the control of the bureaucrats. . . .

(6) *The September Setback*

While people were rejoicing, boldly forging ahead, and loudly talking about a "thorough victory," the great teacher of the proletariat saw a new danger on the horizon. Let us look at the content of this new danger!

On the one hand even the "Red" capitalist class, owing to the nakedness of its "February suppression of rebellion," keenly perceived the inevitability of its own defeat. After May, China's "Red" capitalists changed their tactics. In many places there appeared a trend of cadres "making appearances." One after another, Red capitalists like Sung Jen-ch'iung in the Northeast and Chang Po-shen in Hunan—bloodsucking vampires who used to ride roughshod over the people—suddenly displayed "fervor" for the revolutionary struggle of the slaves. Individually they declared support for the revolutionary masses in their bombardment of the power-holders in the military region or district commands. As at that time the revolutionary people had not yet tried to overthrow the capitalist-roaders as a class, and as the proletariat and the broad masses of revolutionary people were still under the influence of the doctrine of "revolution through dragging out people" and "revolution by dismissal of officials," people believed that the purpose of the Cultural Revolution was the purging of individual capitalist-roaders and that it was proper to

use some of the revolutionary leading cadres (who were also bureaucrats) for attacking other bureaucrats. As a result, this tactic of big and small Chang Po-shens easily deceived the people. This determined the objective inevitability that the [Red] bourgeoisie would wrest the fruits of victory of the August Storm. Meanwhile, owing to the hurried suppression by the bourgeoisie and the immediate counteroffensive by the proletariat after February, dictatorship by the revolutionary committees—a power organ during the transition to the ‘Commune’—had not yet begun. There was no [protracted] period of transition in which the “Red” capitalists could fraudulently win the trust of the people and suppress the people. The people therefore could not learn from bloody facts that the capitalist-roads were a class; and did not accept the program of the first Cultural Revolution—a revolution of one class overthrowing another. Thorough social revolution could not be carried out.

On the other hand, to realize the demand in the May 7 Directive for changes in the army, it was necessary to carry through to the end the Cultural Revolution in the field armies. It was also necessary to cause the field armies to “support the Left.” As a matter of fact, without first launching an all-out campaign of “supporting the Left” among the field armies, it would be Leftist adventurism to carry out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution among the field armies and try to win an immediate victory.

There was also the problem of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the rural areas. If no revolutionary storm took place in the countryside, no power-seizure of any kind would represent the true interests of the peasants. The May 7 Directive called for factories to set up and operate farms, and for rural villages to set up and operate workshops. It indicated that in the new commune, the differences between industry and farming, and between urban and rural areas, will be much smaller than at present. This reduction of the gap should be brought about by launching a peasant movement—a locomotive of historical progress—guided by the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Before the peasant movement is launched, it is empty talk to try to win a complete victory of the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. While complete victory is unrealistic, the task of the Marxists-Leninists is to show the hypocrisy of the clamor for “thorough victory.” Should the [Ultra-Left] Marxist-Leninists have power, they should exercise it in banning the cry to “immediately overthrow the revolutionary committee and establish the commune” as well as any agitation for this purpose, so that the splendid name of “commune” may not be tarnished by false practice.

Meanwhile, the capitalist bureaucratic class in the Party and army began to carry out sabotage against the Central Cultural Revolution Group in August and September. They deliberately created confusion in the army, and caused stagnation in economic and other spheres. [As a matter of fact, this “stagnation” was largely brought about by the disorders during the “August Revolution.”] A senior army cadre openly and arrogantly assailed the Central Cultural Revolution Group. This was their general policy in August and September. “Does the Central Cultural Revolution Group still want the Peoples Liberation Army? If it doesn’t, then we will pack up and go home. The Central Cultural Revolution Group has so shifted the veteran army cadres that

they are separated from their wives and children, their homes broken up, and their kin lost!"

In view of this series of developments . . . the wise supreme commander, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, once again disregarded the unrealistic demands of impatient revolutionaries for victory and made a broad retreat after September [1967]. . . . The extent of this retreat was unprecedented. The unlimited relaxation of the cadre policy after September was in fact an extensive concession to the capitalist-roaders, who were allowed to remount the stage. . . .

But because the revolutionary forces of the proletariat have been greatly strengthened, the retreat has not ended in a "rout" as it did in February. This time the bourgeoisie has not been able, as in March, to devour the revolution in one gulp. In Hunan, the revolutionary forces bombarding Chou En-lai were not annihilated. On the contrary, they established Sheng-wu-lien and have made progress in certain respects. This is proof that the revolutionary force has grown up and become strong.

To seize the fruits of victory won by the proletariat in August, and turn the mass dictatorship again into bureaucratic rule, the bourgeoisie in the revolutionary committees must first disarm the working class. The guns in the hands of workers have infinitely strengthened the power of the working class. This fact is a mortal threat to the bourgeoisie, who fear workers holding guns. Out of spontaneous hatred for the bureaucrats who tried to snatch the fruit of victory, the revolutionary people shouted a resounding revolutionary slogan: "Giving up our guns amounts to suicide." Moreover, they formed a spontaneous, nationwide mass "arms concealment movement" for the armed overthrow of the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

The August gun-seizing movement was great. It was not only unprecedented in capitalist countries, but also, for the first time in a socialist country, it accomplished the fact of turning the whole nation into soldiers. Before the Cultural Revolution, the bureaucrats did not dare actually to hand over arms to the people. The militia is merely a facade behind which the bureaucrats control the armed strength of the people. It is certainly not an armed force of the working class, but rather a docile tool in the hands of the bureaucrats. In the gun-seizing movement, the masses, instead of receiving arms like favors from above, for the first time seized arms from the hands of the bureaucrats by relying on the violent force of the revolutionary people themselves. For the first time, the workers held their "own" arms. Chairman Mao's inspiring call, "Arm the Left" [no such direct statement by Mao has been found], was the intensive focus of the courage of the working class. But the issuance of the September 5 Directive [to return the weapons to the Army] completely nullified the call to "Arm the Left." The working class was disarmed. The bureaucrats again came back to power.

(7) The Political Enlightenment of the Proletariat

The editorial of July 1, 1967 [in PD, taken from RF, No. 11] raised the question of Party building. During the violent class struggle in July and August, a very small number of "Ultra-Leftists" put forward the demand that the "Ultra-Left should have its own political party." It was felt necessary to have the

basic level organizations of a revolutionary party in order to realize Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership in the Communist Party, to actuate the people to overthrow the new bourgeoisie, and to fulfill the task of the first Cultural Revolution. In this way, the dream of a few intellectuals in Peking in the initial stage of the movement to rebuild a Marxist-Leninist Group became, for the first time, a practical and steadily growing demand of the fighting proletariat: "To make revolution, it is necessary to have a revolutionary party!" [It would seem that the authors of the essay advocate the formation of "Marxist-Leninist" cells at the "basic levels" of the existing Party. The paragraph, however, is not entirely clear.]

During the past several months, the class struggle has entered a higher stage. What sort of stage is it? In this stage, the revolutionary people have already accumulated the rich experience of "redistribution of property and power" on two occasions (the January and August Revolutions). This experience is the program of the first Cultural Revolution, which was produced by the January Revolution, for a great revolution in China in which one class overthrows another. It is to "overthrow the new bourgeoisie and build a new society without bureaucrats similar to the Paris Commune—the Peoples Commune of China." There is also the method, suggested in the August Storm, of gradually bringing about revolutionary changes in the Army and of armed seizure of power.

The reverses and the higher-stage struggle after September [1967] also tell the revolutionary people why neither the January Revolution nor the August Revolution ended in thorough victory; why, after such prolonged struggle, the fruits of victory were snatched away by the bourgeois bureaucrats; why the bourgeoisie was able to recapture the assets and power which they had lost in August; and why the courage and pioneering spirit displayed by the proletariat in the January Revolution and August Storm was almost completely extinguished and submerged. The appearance of a large-scale adverse current tells people that all illusions about bourgeois bureaucrats, and all distrust in the people's own strength, must be completely abandoned; and that the revolution of one class overthrowing another must be carried out.

However, the Revolutionary Committee is a product of the "revolution of dismissing officials." In Hunan, Chang P'ing-hua and Liu Tzu-yun were dismissed from office, but that did not remove the acute antagonism between the new bourgeoisie and the masses of the people. Moreover, a new situation of acute antagonism has emerged between the Revolutionary Committee Preparatory Group and the people, represented by Sheng-wu-lien. A new bourgeois reactionary line, and a new adverse current of capitalist restoration, have again appeared. A complete and stable "distribution of property and power" has not been realized. The revolution of dismissing officials is only bourgeois reformism which, in a zigzag manner, changes the new bureaucratic bourgeois rule prior to the Cultural Revolution into another type of bourgeois rule by bourgeois bureaucrats and a few representatives from several attendant mass organizations. The Revolutionary Committee is a product of bourgeois reformism.

Problems cannot be solved by merely dismissing a few officials. Bourgeois reformism will not work. The result of reformism—the Revolutionary Com-

mittee or its Preparatory Group—again brings about a new bourgeois dictatorship, which arouses even more violent opposition from the people. Events in Heilungkiang, Shantung, Shanghai, Kweichow, Hunan, and other places where revolutionary committees or preparatory groups for such committees have been established, have proved, or are proving that China cannot move in the direction of bourgeois reformism through revolutionary committees, because that means capitalist restoration. China can only go in the direction of the thoroughly revolutionary socialism of the “Peoples Commune of China” as proclaimed by the “Peoples Commune of Peking” of the 1960’s [see Mao’s statement of June 1, 1966, mentioned in Chapter I] The people should be brought to understand this truth and to form their own resolution to carry it out, instead of our determining it for the people. . . .

It is only when all panaceas are proved useless that the revolutionary people will resolve to follow the most painful and most destructive, but also thorough, road of true revolution. The struggle in the transitional period of the revolutionary committees will inevitably disillusion the masses regarding their cherished panacea of bourgeois reformism. . . .

The stage of struggle since last September has been educating the people in this regard about the new phase.

As a result of the practice of struggle having gained rich experience and having entered a higher stage, the maturity of the political thinking of the revolutionary people of China has also entered a higher stage. A new stream of ideas, reviled by the enemy as the “Ultra-Left thought trend” (i.e., “overthrow the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie,” “abolish bureaucratic organs,” “thoroughly smash the state machinery” and similar truths), wanders among the revolutionary people like a “spectre” before the eyes of the enemy. The political-ideological weapon of the revolutionary people for winning the complete victory in the proletarian socialist [sic] great revolution has begun to appear in a new form in the “Ultra-Left faction.” The Thought of Mao Tse-tung, which is carrying out a new social revolution in China, will gradually cause the masses to awake from all contradictions of the past. The revolutionary people are beginning gradually to understand in practice why revolution is necessary, against whom they make the revolution, and how revolution is to be carried out. Revolutionary struggle begins to change from the stage of spontaneity to that of consciousness, from necessity to freedom.

In the higher stage of the struggle since September, a higher stage of the fiery movement of educated youth has also appeared, as well as a higher struggle by contract workers and temporary workers. This plays a great stimulative effect in this stage of enlightening muddled thinking. . . .

When the revolutionary people enter from blindness into the stage of enlightenment of political thinking, when Mao Tse-tung-ism forms an independent, positive, political current of thought among the masses, and its political influence begins gradually to become a fact, the organization and establishment of basic level organizations of the Chinese Communist Party—a political party of Mao Tse-tung-ism—is put on the agenda by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the revolutionary teacher of the proletariat. Comrade Mao Tse-tung puts forward the principle of rebuilding the Party and reorganizing the class ranks

under new historical conditions, i.e., "The Party organization should be formed of advanced elements of the proletariat. It should be a youthful and vigorous vanguard organization capable of leading the proletariat and the revolutionary masses to wage struggles against the class enemy."

The putting forward of this principle for the building of a revolutionary political party—the Mao Tse-tung-ism party (Chinese Communist Party)—that will lead the people to overthrow today's class enemy—the new Red bourgeoisie—proves that in order to fulfill the first true proletarian socialist revolution, and to build in China the "Commune" delineated in the May 7 Directive, the existing Communist Party of China must undergo revolutionary changes. The convening of the 9th National Congress of the Party is not expected to settle completely the question of whether the Communist Party is going [the Congress convened on April 1, 1969]. The political party that will emerge [in the 9th Party Congress?] in accordance with the provisions promulgated by the present Central Committee for rehabilitation, regulation, and rebuilding of the Party (if such a party can be formed) will necessarily be a party of bourgeois reformism that serves the bourgeois usurpers in the revolutionary committees. The convening of the 9th Party Congress will be only a reflection of local "revolutionary committees" in the Central Committee during the transitional period. This determines the fact that the "9th Congress" can never thoroughly settle the question of whether China is going (the core problem of which is whether the Chinese Communist Party and whether the Peoples Liberation Army).

When a truly stable victory gradually becomes possible, the following several questions will become salient.

1. The unevenness of the revolution will assume prominence. The possibility of first winning true, thorough victory in one or several provinces, overthrowing the product of bourgeois reformism—the rule of revolutionary committees—and reestablishing political power of the Paris Commune type, will become a crucial problem if the revolution is to be able to develop in depth with rapidity. This is unlike the previous period, which was a blind and spontaneous stage in which the unbalanced character of the revolution played a decisive role in the development of the revolution.

2. To truly overthrow the rule of the new aristocracy and completely smash the old state machinery, it will be necessary to go into the question of how to evaluate the past 17 years. This is also a major problem of fundamentally teaching the people why it is necessary to carry out the Cultural Revolution, and what its final objective is.

3. To make the revolution really victorious, it will be necessary to settle the question: "Who are our enemies, who are our friends?" This "paramount question of the revolution" requires that we make a new analysis of China's society, where "a new situation has arisen as a result of great class changes," so as to revise the class standings, rally our friends, and topple our enemies.

This series of new questions was raised by Comrade Chiang Ch'ing in her speech on November 12, 1967 [full text in *CCP Documents*, pp. 596-601]. This speech of Comrade Chiang Ch'ing announced the beginning of a new stage, unparalleled in history, into which the Great Proletarian Cultural Revo-

lution has entered. Though this important speech dealt only with the literary and art circles, "the revolution of literature and art is the vanguard of political revolution." The joyous reviving and burgeoning struggle among Chinese literary and art circles shows the direction which China's revolution will take. Actually, Comrade Chiang Ch'ing's speech tells us that the revolution in the previous period . . . was basically dealing with problems in the Cultural Revolution, and with the problem of the 50 days that shielded the past 17 years. It merely touched upon the charm that protects the bourgeoisie. It tells us that the real revolution, the revolution to negate the past 17 years, has basically not yet begun. . . .

The genesis and development of Hunan's Sheng-wu-lien represents prominently the growth in strength of the proletariat since September. Sheng-wu-lien was in fact born of the experience of the Attack With Words, Defend With Arms Headquarters (run by the people)—a form of dictatorship of the January Revolution. It is a power organ of mass dictatorship of a higher grade than those of January and August. It may be compared to the soviets of the January [and February, 1917] revolution in the Soviet Union [at that time still Russia], when power was usurped by the bourgeoisie. The Provincial Revolutionary Committee Preparatory Group also is comparable to the bourgeois Provisional Government in Russia of that time. The contradiction between Sheng-wu-lien and the Preparatory Group is a new situation in which "power organs of two systems co-exist" as the soviets and the Provisional Government co-existed in the Russia of 1917. However, the actual power is in the hands of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee Preparatory Group—the bourgeois Provisional Government.

Sheng-wu-lien is a newborn sprout comparable to the soviets of 1917. It is an embryo form of a more mature "commune." . . . This correct newborn Red political power of Sheng-wu-lien will certainly mature and gather strength continuously amid big winds and waves.

(8) *Refute the Reactionary "Second Revolution Doctrine"*

The current answer to the serious question of where China is going, an answer which dominates the ideological field, is the reactionary "doctrine of second revolution." People's minds are greatly confused. Almost unanimously they say: "The first Great Cultural Revolution can do only so much. There is nothing we can do except wait for the second revolution." After the failure of the Great Revolution [1924–1927], the admitted division of the country under the warlords became the rule of "Commanders-in-chief of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Army." To maintain and prop up the rule of Chiang Kai-shek, Ch'en Tu-hsiu's reactionary "second revolution" was opportunely brought forth. [Ch'en was the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party, who was expelled in 1927.] The "doctrine of second revolution" used the superficial change in political power to deceive the people. It declared that imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, and feudalism had been overthrown, that China's bourgeoisie had gained the political power, that the democratic revolution was accomplished, and that we had only to wait for the [second, i.e.,] socialist revolution. This reactionary trend of thought not only dominated intellectual

circles in the country generally, but also enjoyed considerable popularity even within the Communist Party.

However, the task of China's bourgeois democratic revolution as determined by the basic contradictions in Chinese society—the contradiction between imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism, and feudalism on one side, and the broad masses of the people, on the other—was not yet fulfilled. Therefore, despite the prevalence for a time of the seemingly strong second revolution, the more vigorous and intensive development of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal people's revolution was still governed by an objective law that does not change according to man's wish.

Similarly, the task that has to be accomplished at the "end" of the first Great Cultural Revolution is determined by the social contradictions that led to this revolution. Unless the program of the first Great Cultural Revolution, prescribed by these social contradictions, is carried out, the first Great Cultural Revolution can never be brought to an end.

As said in the preceding paragraphs, the basic social contradictions that gave rise to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution are contradictions between the rule of the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the mass of the people. The growth and intensification of these contradictions determine the need for more thorough changes in the society. This means overthrow of the rule of the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie, complete smashing of the old state machinery, realization of social revolution, carrying out the redistribution of property and power, and the establishment of a new society—the "Peoples Commune of China." This is the basic program and final goal of the first Great Cultural Revolution.

As of today, are these basic contradictions of Chinese society resolved? Has the objective of the first Great Cultural Revolution been attained?

As stated above, the form of political power has superficially been changed. The old Provincial Party Committee and old Military District Command have become the "Revolutionary Committee" or "Revolutionary Committee Preparatory Group." The old bureaucrats continue, however, to play the leading role in the "new political power." The contradiction between the old Provincial Party Committee and old Military District Command on one side, and the people on the other, and the contradiction between the capitalist-roaders of the 47th Army and the people, remain basically unresolved. The contradiction between the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the mass of the people is also basically unresolved; it appears in the new form of contradiction between Sheng-wu-lien and the "new political power" [i.e., the Preparatory Group]. All the basic social changes which must be carried out by the first Great Cultural Revolution, such as overthrow of the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie, changes in the armed forces, and the establishing of communes, have not been carried out. Of course, such "redistribution of property and power" was partially and temporarily realized during the January Revolution and August Storm. But the fruits of victory of both the January Revolution and August Storm were basically usurped by the [Red] bourgeoisie. Social reforms were aborted. Social changes were not consolidated and fully realized. And the "end" of the first Great Cultural Revolution was not attained. As

the masses have said: "Everything remains the same after so much ado."

Since the basic social contradictions that led to the eruption of the first Great Cultural Revolution have not been resolved but are becoming more and more acute in new forms, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is developing more intensively and vigorously, in spite of the seemingly powerful reactionary "second revolution doctrine" which dominates intellectual circles and deceives the masses with a superficial change in the form of political power. This development of the Cultural Revolution is in accordance with objective law and independent of the wishes of men. The usurping [Red] bourgeoisie hope to corrode the resistance of the revolutionary people with the doctrine of second revolution. But whoever supports their rule and sinister scheme will certainly go bankrupt, just as Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "doctrine of second revolution" was unable to save the Chiang family dynasty, and as the powerful controls of religious thought failed to stop the disintegration and collapse of the economic basis of feudalism. The new trend of thought (the Ultra-Left trend of thought) is still weak and somewhat immature. But its overcoming of apparently powerful traditional ideas, and the rotten, mummified doctrine of second revolution, will be the inevitable trend of historical development.

The bourgeoisie [in general] always describe the political form of their rule as most perfect and flawless in the service of the whole people. The new bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and the Rightist pig-dogs of the petty bourgeoisie who depend on them, are at present doing [in China] exactly that. They ignore the provisional character of the "Revolutionary Committee" while praising it nauseatingly. Marxist-Leninists must relentlessly expose the suppression of the revolutionary people by the Revolutionary Committee, must energetically declare that the Peoples Commune of China is the society which we proletarian and revolutionary people must bring about in the Cultural Revolution, and must energetically make known the inevitable doom of the Revolutionary Committee. . . .

Some people criticize us for wanting to reach communism in one step by immediately eliminating classes and the three major differences. They say that a regime of the Paris Commune type, as envisaged by Chairman Mao, is a dream; and that all this is unrealistic before the realization of communism. These people deliberately distort our views. We certainly do not wish to do away immediately with classes, with the legal rights of the [remaining] bourgeoisie, or the three major differences. This is indeed impossible before the realization of communism. They are taken only as our highest program, not our lowest. Our minimum program calls for the overthrow of the rule of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the narrowing of the three major differences. It is of course not [yet] possible to destroy the exploiting classes. After the victory of the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, there will inevitably be new class changes. It is these new class changes that will again lead to new social reform, and so push history forward. . . .

People who criticize us in this way actually are saying that all our efforts will be in vain, that society cannot take a new leap, and that property and power cannot be "redistributed" but can only be somewhat altered. Forgetful

gentlemen! The January Revolution and the August Storm already did bring about (although only temporarily and locally) a "redistribution of property and power" and a qualitative leap of the whole society. Has that not already shattered the gloomy liquidationist views you spread?

Cadres of the proletariat have not yet matured politically, and the revolutionary people have not yet produced cadres with true proletarian authority. Hence, we are almost unanimously condemned by people saying that we have no use for cadres and want to make them all stand aside. . . .

We really believe that 90 per cent of the senior cadres should stand aside; and that at best they can only be subjects for education and uniting. This is because they have already come to form a decaying class with its own particular "interests." Their relation with the people has changed from that, in the past, between leaders and the led to that between exploiters and the exploited, between oppressors and the oppressed. Most of them, consciously or unconsciously, yearn for the capitalist road, and cherish and nurture capitalist things. Rule by their class has completely blocked the development of history.

Is it possible, instead of overthrowing this class, that they can be persuaded to give up the vested interests derived from their bourgeois legal rights, such as high salaries, and follow the socialist instead of the capitalist road? The proletariat truly has made steady efforts in that direction. Chairman Mao's extensive concessions to the bourgeoisie are the pure expression of these efforts. However, the bureaucrats have once again launched a counterattack, and reverse accounts with increasing frenzy, pushing themselves closer and closer to the guillotine. All this proves that no decaying class has ever been willing voluntarily to exit from the stage of history.

In the new society of the Paris Commune type, this class will be overthrown. This was demonstrated by the iron-clad facts, so surprising to mediocre people, of the great changes in the January Revolution and the August Storm. Those who will rise and take their place will be cadres with true proletarian authority who will be produced naturally by the revolutionary people in the struggle to overthrow this decaying class [of the Red bureaucrats]. These cadres will be members of the commune. They will have no special privileges. Economically, they will receive the same treatment as the masses in general. They may be dismissed or replaced at any time at the request of the masses. Such new cadres with [true] authority have not yet emerged.

However, such cadres will be produced spontaneously as the political thinking of the revolutionary people grows in maturity. This is a natural result of the political ideological maturity of the proletariat.

(9) Refute the "Leftist" Doctrine of One Revolution

Some infantile revolutionaries of the revolutionary ranks suggest that there is no first or second Cultural Revolution; and that the revolution should proceed until communism is realized. This is the "Leftist" doctrine of one revolution. People who hold this idea are very few in number and they have a low political level. Chairman Mao's theory that the transitional period will be divided into different historical stages is the best enlightenment for them. The revolution must necessarily be in stages. We are for permanent revolution, and also for revolution by stages. . . .

Where China goes also determines where the world goes. China will inevitably go toward the new society of the "Peoples Commune of China."

If dictatorship by the Revolutionary Committee is taken as the final goal of the first Great Cultural Revolution, then China will inevitably go the way already taken by the Soviet Union, and the people will again be returned to the bloody fascist rule of capitalism. The Revolutionary Committee's road of bourgeois reformism is a dead-end.

This is because the present is the age of the great banner of Mao Tse-tung-ism; a great age in which imperialism is going downhill toward its debacle, while socialism goes uphill toward world victory. Today's world is one in which capitalism is definitely dying, and socialism is definitely flourishing. In this great revolutionary period of unprecedented significance, in this era of rapid changes, "miracles—at present not yet thought of but completely conformable to the law of historical development—are bound to happen in the history of mankind." (Ch'en Po-ta, March 24)

Both the victory of the Chinese proletariat and the broad masses of revolutionary people, and the extermination of the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie, are likewise inevitable. The world-shaking great festival of the revolutionary people—the overthrow of the Revolutionary Committee and birth of the "Peoples Commune of China—will surely come.

The commune of the "Ultra-Left faction" does not conceal its views and intentions. We publicly declare that our objective of establishing the "Peoples Commune of China" can only be achieved by forceful overthrow of the bourgeois dictatorship and the revisionist system of the Revolutionary Committee. Let the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie tremble before the true socialist revolution that shakes the world! What the proletariat can lose in this revolution is only their chains, what they gain will be the whole world!

The China of tomorrow will be the world of the "Commune."

Long live Mao Tse-tung-ism!

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